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AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM 
Aziz Z. Huq 
 
Forthcoming 2010 Supreme Court Review 
 
Terrorist attacks trigger novel policy responses. New policies selected by the 
federal executive after the 9/11 attacks strained against constitutionally 
permissible margins, and prompted diverse judicial responses. The resulting 
scholarly literature is largely normative. But the currently dominant accounts of 
national security jurisprudence also each include some descriptive claim about 
what courts in fact do. Each account further claims that courts do something 
distinctive in these cases. That is, in the course of making a prescriptive argument 
for what courts ought to do differently in national security cases, these accounts 
make a descriptive claim about what courts in fact do differently in this class of 
cases. I argue that this threshold descriptive claim—call it “national security 
exceptionalism”—finds no empirical support in at least one important class of 
post-9/11 cases concerning emergency detention policies. Instead, judicial 
responses to national security emergencies align closely with transubstantive 
trends in public law and judicial responses to non-security emergencies. Using 
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Ashcroft v Iqbal as a starting point, I 
examine the close and largely unexamined relationship between national security 
jurisprudence and the larger domain of public law doctrine and practice. 
Situating judicial responses to national security emergencies in a more general 
public law context draws attention to the role emergencies can play in catalyzing 
larger legal changes law, and the effect of transubstantive trends on emergency 
responses. It further may have a bearing on the emergent “national security” 
discipline in the legal academy. 
 
 
Terrorist attacks trigger novel policy responses. New policies selected by the federal 
executive after the 9/11 attacks strained against constitutionally permissible margins. Affected 
individuals lodged legal challenges to the new policies in federal court. Judges’ responses ranged 
from self-abnegating denials of jurisdiction to aggressive repudiations of the executive’s 
initiatives. The diversity of judicial responses prompted debate and analysis. The resulting 
scholarly literature is largely normative. Sustained attention to “what courts actually do” has 
been “sparse.”1 Nevertheless, the normative accounts of courts’ role in national security 
emergencies that now dominate the legal scholarship include not only normative 
                                                 
 Assistant professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to participants at a University of 
Chicago Law School faculty workshop for helpful and insightful criticism. I am grateful for comments from Daniel 
Abebe, Adam Cox, Rosalind Dixon, Bernard Harcourt, Alison LaCroix, Saul Levmore, Jonathan Masur, Richard 
McAdams, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, Adam Samaha, Stephen Schulhofer, Geoffrey Stone, and especially 
David Strauss. All errors, of course, are mine alone. 
1 Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation *2 (unpublished manuscript, 
2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297287 (visited Feb 16, 2010). 
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“justification[s]” but also efforts at descriptive “fit.”2 That is, the dominant accounts of judicial 
responses to national security crises each offer, with varying degrees of conviction, a descriptive 
account of what courts in fact do in national security emergencies. Each account further claims 
that courts do something distinctive in these cases. This descriptive claim—that what courts do in 
national security crises is somehow different from what they do elsewhere—in turn underwrites 
theories of what courts should do differently in security emergencies. I call the threshold 
descriptive claim “national security exceptionalism.”3  
This essay examines the descriptive claim that judicial responses to national security 
emergencies are in some fashion distinctive and hence warrant special, separate justification or 
criticism. I argue that “national security exceptionalism” finds no empirical support in at least 
one important class of post-9/11 cases: challenges to emergency detention policies.4 In the 
litigation trenches, judicial responses to national security emergencies do not match up with the 
responses predicted by any of the dominant theories found in the literature. Rather, they align 
more closely with transubstantive trends in public law and with judicial responses to non-
security emergencies. This suggests there is nothing sui generis about the behavior of courts in 
the domain of national security exigency, or at least that the thesis of exceptionalism is 
overstated.  
One case from the October 2008 Term places in clear relief the close and largely 
unexamined relationship between national security jurisprudence and the larger domain of public 
law doctrine and practice. In Ashcroft v Iqbal, a five-Justice majority of the Court dismissed as 
inadequately pleaded a civil damages suit filed by a Pakistani national detained in the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.5 On the one hand, Iqbal can be viewed (and indeed has been 
understood) as the most recent in a run of cases in which the Court has grappled with the 
granularity of the threshold pleading rule in federal civil actions.6 On the other hand, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Iqbal transformed dramatically the basic pleading rule largely by 
dint of emphasizing the national security context of the case at bar. Iqbal illustrates one side of 
the relationship between national security case law and the larger domain of public law: 
Emergencies are opportunities for sweeping doctrinal and functional changes affecting many 
                                                 
2 The distinction is adapted from Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 254–58 (Harvard, 1986).  
3 I use this term to describe only judicial responses to national security emergencies. None of the accounts address—
and I am not concerned with—each and every case that might conceivably be subsumed under a “national security” 
label, from servicemen’s religious liberty claims, see Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986) (holding that First 
Amendment does not prevent Air Force from prohibiting yarmulkes), to clashes between environmental rules with 
military training needs, see Winter v Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc, 129 S Ct 365 (2008) (overturning a 
preliminary injunction against the Navy that was based on threat to marine wildlife).  
4 The kind of case study approach here raises problems of sample bias and selection effects. In my view, the non-
criminal detention cases are the most consequential in terms of both security and liberty; they are also the most 
contentious. If this analysis simply throws light in a non-quantitative way on the direction and general motivating 
factors behind judicial intervention, I believe it contributes to the literature.  
5 129 S Ct 1937 (2009) (dismissing for failure to state a claim a damages action by former immigration detainee 
against two high-level federal officials).  
6 See, for example, Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 556 (2007); Erickson v Pardus, 551 US 89, 93–94 
(2007) (per curiam). Even before it was decided, Iqbal was viewed as the continuance of this line of cases. See 
Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 Iowa L Rev 873, 877 (2009). 
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subject matters. The other side of the coin is the pervasive influence of familiar remedial and 
doctrinal strategies in what has been characterized as a unique body of national security 
jurisprudence.  
Rejecting the descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism has consequences for 
understanding and evaluating federal courts’ work in the face of national security exigency. 
Analyzing judicial responses to national security emergencies in tandem with the larger body of 
public law draws attention to transubstantive trends in judicial behavior, and also to the role that 
emergencies can play in catalyzing larger changes across the domain of public law. The analysis 
may have a further bearing on the emergent “national security” discipline in the legal academy.  
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the disjunction between the 
outcomes predicted by the dominant accounts of national security jurisprudence and litigated 
outcomes. Part II compares national security cases first to a larger domain of public law and 
second, to a recent non-security emergency in which the federal courts played a minor role. Part 
III concludes by offering some tentative hypotheses about the consequences of rejecting the 
descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism. 
 
I. 
 
The literature on judicial responses to national security emergencies is diverse but largely 
normative. In one corner are celebrations of judges’ counter-majoritarian role as a “corrective” to 
the popular democratic tendency “to give inadequate weight to civil liberties in wartime” or 
crisis, when panic and other emotions distort policy outcomes.7 In another are prescriptions of 
broad judicial deference on the ground that “there is no general reason to think that judges can do 
better than government at balancing security and liberty during emergencies.”8 Intermediate 
positions posit judges as agents of social learning,9 or praise their fidelity to separation-of-power 
ideals.10 Seemingly disparate, these accounts are alike in two important ways. First, each makes 
some descriptive claim, relatively strong or weak, about what federal courts do in cases touching 
on national security emergencies.11 Such descriptive claims of “fit” are made in support of 
                                                 
7 Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 
544 (W.W. Norton, 2004). Accord Stephen Holmes, The Matador’s Cape: America’s Reckless Response to Terror 
233 (Oxford, 2007) (“Wartime leaders … need some form of adversarial process to protect them from cognitive bias 
and false certainties.”).  
8 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 31 (Oxford, 2007). 
9 Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wisc L Rev 274. 
10 Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An 
Institutional Process Approach to Rights during Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 (2004). 
11 All of the accounts discussed here trade in descriptive claims even if they are largely normative. The descriptive 
claims can be isolated from the larger prescriptive frameworks. First, the “social learning” thesis looks to “historical 
examples” and “identifies a pattern in those examples.” Tushnet, 2003 Wisc L Rev at 274 (cited in note 9). Second, 
the “heroic” countermajoritarian model is the most cautious of the five in advancing descriptive claims. See 
generally Stone, Perilous Times at 542–50 (cited in note 7). But some of its advocates propose that “the Court [has] 
imposed essential checks on executive power.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive 
Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 UC Davis L Rev 1, 17 (2006). Third, the executive accommodation view 
“describes the law as it has actually operated in the courts.” Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 16 (cited 
in note 8). Fourth, national security minimalists say that “an identifiable form of minimalism captures the practices 
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normative arguments. Second, all the descriptive claims share a common assumption: Each 
asserts there is something distinctive about the pattern of judicial supervision of emergency 
national security policies. Because each theory aspires to justify a normative account of the 
judicial role distinct to national security, it paints judicial behavior in the exigent national 
security domain as different from judicial behavior at other times. Implicitly or explicitly, the 
theories assume that some factor unique to national security emergencies—e.g., the tendency of 
democratic governments to echo public panics, the breakdown of multi-branch deliberation, or 
the executive’s informational advantage and agility—already shape what courts do. National 
security exceptionalism is thus underwritten implicitly by the sense that judicial behavior 
changes in response to the unique dynamics of a security emergency.12   
This Part begins by sketching briefly the five dominant theoretical accounts in the 
literature that identify regularities in judicial responses to national security policies on the way to 
making normative claims about what courts should do. It then describes the observed 
consequences of federal court litigation, in one particular area of law—non-criminal detention on 
national security grounds. Specifically, I gauge consequences by looking at judges’ selection 
between different remedies. This focus on remedies is central to my analytical method. Remedies 
provide a more fine-grained tool for assessing the consequences of judicial action than 
dichotomous metrics such as win/loss rates or tendencies to deference that are used in other 
studies. Finally, I consider whether any of the five dominant theoretical accounts generate good 
predictions of observed outcomes.  
Three caveats are in order. First, this Part isolates descriptive elements from accounts that 
are largely normative. To the extent they include description, the theories of the judicial role in 
national security on offer generally do not try to predict every case outcome in the way that a 
theory in the physical sciences might. Instead, a theory will “set an agenda” or “prescribe a 
direction” that fits a majority or large plurality of cases.13  It will also provide a baseline to 
identify and to criticize outlying results.14 A perfect hit rate is neither demanded nor ever found.  
Second, theoretical accounts of the role of courts in regard to national security tend to 
operate at a high level of generality. None of the accounts examined in this Part identifies which 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the American courts when national security is threatened.” Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup Ct Rev 
47, 50; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 
Sup Ct Rev l, 1 (“Liberty-promoting minimalism can be found at diverse stages of American history.”). Finally, 
bilateralilsm institutional endorsement is offered as the “framework for analysis that American courts have used in 
earlier eras of exigent circumstances.” Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 at 5 (cited in note 10). Whatever 
the larger normative projects of these accounts, in each case there is a descriptive element that plausibly can be 
isolated. In each case, the descriptive claim implies that judicial behavior in national security cases is distinctive.   
12 National security exceptionalism could take strong and weak forms. The strong form suggests that a unique 
dynamic directs outcomes in all cases touched by national security concerns. The weak version of national security 
exceptionalism suggests that exigent responses to national security threats elicit different judicial responses from 
exigent policies in other policy domains. This weak version of national security exceptionalism, which seems more 
plausible, is the one principally examined here.  
13 David A. Strauss, The Intellectual Crisis of Judicial Conservatism *9 (unpublished manuscript, July 2009) (on file 
with author). 
14 See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 271 (cited in note 8) (describing the result in 
Hamdan as “lawless”). 
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judicial remedies it would prescribe or predict in particular cases, nor even discusses the question 
of remedial selection at all. This is a failing of each account. It is not clear that the cost to 
analytic parsimony from closer attention to the question of remedies would be great. But, the 
absence of discussion of remedies also means that none of the theoretical accounts can be 
criticized directly for failing to predict particular outcomes.15 As a result, the analysis in this Part 
must proceed by trying as best as possible to identify the distribution of remedies implied by a 
given theoretical account, and then by comparing that inferred set of outcomes to the observed 
outcomes.  
Third, one counter-argument to my analytic project would point out that some of the 
theoretical accounts considered here are not limited to national security. Hence, it might be 
argued, they make no claim to identify a unique pattern of judicial responses in national security 
cases.  Minimalism, to pick the most obvious candidate, took shape first as a general account of 
the judicial role.16 The object of criticism here, the claim of descriptive “uniqueness,” is thus 
chimerical. But this counter-argument is overstated. Even theories with broader normative 
ambitions are presented as especially attractive in the national security domain because the latter 
is one area of law in which courts follow the normative prescription. Consider minimalism, the 
most generalizable of the five theoretical accounts considered. Minimalism is presented as 
especially successful in the national security arena even though, its proponents concede, in other 
areas of the law it is only aspirational.17 Minimalism may have broad aspirations, but its narrow 
claim to descriptive success is articulated most powerfully with respect to national security 
jurisprudence. Hence it is properly classified as a kind of national security exceptionalism.   
 
A. 
 
Scholarly attention to the judicial role respecting national security has produced five 
accounts of the federal courts’ function: i) the “social learning” thesis; ii) heroic counter-
majoritarianism; iii) the executive accommodation account; iv) national security minimalism; 
and v) bilateral institutional endorsement. Each theory is “a set of interrelated causal 
propositions” that “hol[d] out the … promise of a successful explanation.”18 The five theories 
also leverage a descriptive account of what courts do to support a normative prescription about 
what courts should do.19 The descriptive and the normative converge. Exceptions are cause for 
condemnation and criticism.  
The first account of the judicial role in national security is the “social learning” model. 
This model offers an explanation of judicial outcomes within a larger framework of historical 
                                                 
15 It seems to me unsatisfying, though, to defend a theory against the allegation of inaccuracy with the assertion that 
the theory operates only on a higher level of generality. Why bother with a general theory of judicial review in a 
given policy space if it bears no relation to judicial outcomes on the ground?  
16 See generally Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard, 1999). 
17 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 Stan L Rev 1899, 1910–15 (2006) (describing challenges to 
minimalism).  
18 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 17 (Cambridge, 2007).  
19 See note 11 (collecting citations and quotations of descriptive claims for each account). 
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change. Social learning views judicial intervention as a cog in “a process of social learning in 
which past examples of what come to be understood as incursions on civil liberties progressively 
reduce the scope of civil liberties violations in wartime.”20 The government acts; the courts 
endorse; but then “society” concludes that the threat was exaggerated and the response 
excessive.21 Korematsu v United States22 furnishes the archetypal example. Both democratic 
branches of the national government adopted a sweeping detention policy later endorsed by the 
federal courts. Subsequently, “society reache[d] a judgment that the action was unjustified and 
courts mistaken.”23 Rather than providing affirmative guidance for subsequent decisions, the 
ensuing precedent exerts a negative gravity by instantiating the Court’s moral nadir.24  
 Second, the “heroic” model views the federal judiciary as a counter-majoritarian check 
on the political branches’ tendency to trade away constitutional entitlements in moments of 
crisis. Like the social learning model, it starts from the view that at times when “the nation faced 
extraordinary pressures—and temptations” to suppress dissent and to target vulnerable 
minorities, politicians have succumbed to those pressures and have gone “too far” detaining and 
punishing individuals for their views or because of their ethnic, racial, or religious identity.25 On 
this account, the constituent pressure on government to engage in animus-based measures 
lacking sound justification increases in wartime. For advocates of the heroic model, the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” then becomes a “striking” advantage for the federal courts.26 Insulated by 
life tenure, judges will resist the momentary heat-wave of invidious motives better than elected 
officials.27 It is predictable and “appropriate,” on this account, that “the judiciary gives greater 
protection to civil liberties than the legislature or the executive.”28  
Third, the “executive accommodation” model insists on the dexterity and informational 
advantages of the executive over both other branches, and argues on their basis that judicial 
interventions will in the aggregate do more harm than good. This model is based on the 
observation that the executive has an institutional advantage in responding to emergencies 
because of its ability to aggregate and process information, to respond quickly, and to do so in 
                                                 
20 Tushnet, 2003 Wisc L Rev at 275 (cited in note 9). 
21 Id at 287. 
22 323 US 214 (1944).  
23 Tushnet, 2003 Wisc L Rev at 287 (cited in note 9); Stone, Perilous Times at 537 (cited in note 7).  
24 See, for example, Stenberg v Carhart, 530 US 915, 953 (2000) (Scalia, dissenting) (invoking Korematsu and Dred 
Scott, as negative examples of Court at its worst); Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 344 n 30 (1993) (Stevens dissenting) 
(urging that any attempt to follow Korematsu must proceed with “extreme caution”); Skinner v Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 US 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall dissenting) (same); see also City of Richmond . J.A. Croson, 
Co.. 488 US 469, 501 (1989) (invoking Korematsu as a reason not to defer to official justifications for the use of 
race in government decision-making).  
25 Stone, Perilous Times at 12–13 (cited in note 7); id at 528-30; see generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double 
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (New Press, 2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil 
Liberties and the War on Terrorism, 45 Washburn L J 1, 14 (2005).  
26 Stone, Perilous Times at 543; cf Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar 
of Politics 16 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1986). 
27 See, for example, Chemerinsky, 40 UC Davis L Rev at 17 (cited in note 11). 
28 Stone, Perilous Times at 544 (cited in note 7).  
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secret.29 Judicial action will be characterized by high error rates because courts lack information 
and suffer from the same distorting influences as democratic branches. At the same time, 
“erroneous judicial invalidation of new security policies can produce large harms.”30  
The fourth model is national security minimalism.31 Minimalism in general is 
characterized by a preference for “shallowness”—incompletely reasoned decisions that eschew 
theorization of divisive fundamental issues—and “narrowness”—resolution of as few legal or 
factual disputes as feasible per decision.32 Standing alone, minimalism is “a strictly procedural 
instruction” that generates no guidance as to the choice between government and a private 
litigant.33 In the national security context, miminalism has three traits: a demand for clear 
congressional authorization, the requirement of individual “hearing rights,” and a preference for 
“narrow, incompletely theorized decisions.”34  
The final account of courts’ role in national security, “bilateral institutional 
endorsement,” endows the judiciary with a democratic deliberation-forcing function. It suggests 
courts are not well-placed to make first-order decisions about the allocation of substantive 
liberties. Judges’ comparative advantage instead lies in identifying the appropriate institutional 
arrangement to generate optimal policy decisions.35 In war and emergency, as power ebbs to the 
executive, judges insist on a sharing of decisional power between the two elected branches “with 
different democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different interests.”36 On this account, 
better decisions emerge from the judicially mandated participation of multiple democratic 
actors.37 The courts’ goal, therefore, is the forcing of multi-branch democratic deliberation at a 
time when such deliberation has been short-circuited by exigency.  
 
B. 
 
What have federal courts in fact done? Do any of these theories successfully predict the 
responses of courts in actual cases? The purely descriptive literature is “sparse.”38 Studies to date 
have examined invalidation rates, panel effects, and the longitudinal interaction between wartime 
                                                 
29 See generally Posner & Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 15–129, 161–81 (cited in note 8) (canvassing other 
checking devices).  
30 Id at 45. 
31 The model is developed in Sunstein, 2006 Sup Ct Rev at 1 (cited in note 11); see also Sunstein, 2004 Sup Ct Rev 
at 47 (cited in note 11). 
32 Sunstein, 2004 Sup Ct Rev 47 at 48–49 (cited in note 11); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 
105 Mich L Rev 353, 362–66 (2006). 
33 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 19 (cited in note 8).  
34 Sunstein, 2004 Sup Ct Rev 47 at 53–54 (cited in note 11).  
35 Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 at 5 (cited in note 10) (stressing “process-based, institutionally-
focused approach”); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in Democracies at War, 29 Oxford J Legal Stud 189, 
190 (2009).  
36 Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 at 5 (cited in note 10).  
37 See also Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack; Preserving Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror 139 (Yale, 2006) 
(arguing that courts should preserve the political equilibrium between the political branches). 
38 Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11 at 2 (cited in note 1). 
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and changes to aggregate judicial protection of rights.39 Previous empirical analyses have looked 
in the main at win/loss rates but elide important questions of what form judicial intervention 
takes.  
To take stock of the effect of judicial interventions into exigent national-security policy 
making, I look instead at what remedies courts have issued. A focus on remedies is 
instrumentally useful as a means of getting at the consequences of judicial intervention for three 
reasons. First, remedial selection is more varied and more consequential in practical terms than 
metrics such as win/loss rates or decisions to defer or not. Judges have within reach a range of 
remedial strategies, including injunctions and damages actions. Injunctive relief can also be 
tailored by being granted ex ante or ex post. Or it can be issued in retail or wholesale form. 
When courts toggle between damages and various injunctive forms, costs and gains to security or 
liberty may vary. Inattention to remedies elides significant differences.  
Second, attention to remedies and their effects illuminates important timing questions and 
downstream consequences. It invites particular scrutiny of the question whether an individual 
judgment’s effect rippled out to change larger institutional practices.  
Third, a focus on remedies is more informative than separate treatment of substantive and 
procedural rules. For one thing, substantive rulings have been few and far between in the post-
9/11 context. Little has turned on whether substantive constitutional rules are weakened in crisis 
times.40 By contrast, procedural rulings have been consequential. The cash value of judicial 
intervention is a function of both interlocutory and final jurisdictional and procedural rulings that 
have little directly to do with the relative strength of substantive rules in times of crisis.41 And, at 
least in the set of cases under examination here, there is thus “no room for a distinction between 
the abstract, analytic definitions of constitutional rights and remedial concerns that prevent 
courts from enforcing those rights to their ‘true’ limits.”42  
I attend here to one especially active area of national security law in which courts are 
relatively unbounded by statutory limits or channels: new non-criminal detention policies that 
emerged in response to the September 2001 al Qaeda attacks. National security concerns, of 
course, impinge also on the criminal law, surveillance regulation, federal disclosure law, 
immigration law, and financial regulation of charitable giving. But non-criminal detention is a 
useful object of isolated attention. It too presents novel legal issues, complex implementation 
challenges, and a rich body of case law. Unlike criminal cases or litigation under the Freedom of 
                                                 
39 Id; Lee Epstein, et al, The Supreme Court During Crisis, 80 NYU L Rev 1 (2005).  
40 See generally Jenny Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 Colum L Rev 1013 (2008). 
One way of explaining this result is by noticing the relative absence of criminal cases. Courts thus have few 
opportunities for what might be called offensive remediation—dealing with government overreach by, say, 
dismissing an indictment. Rather, they have instead engaged in defensive remediation by denying motions to dismiss 
on jurisdictional grounds and by demanding do-overs with more or different procedure. Hence, there have been 
fewer opportunities for merits rulings and more scope for policy arbitrage through procedural manipulation.   
41 There is a large literature on whether courts should adjust substantive rules or remedies. See, for example, Mark 
V. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Princeton, 2006). Whatever use the distinction has in the social rights context, it is insufficiently granular (or 
largely irrelevant) as a tool for parsing what happens in contemporary national security cases.   
42 Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibrium, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 924 (1999). 
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Information Act,43 non-criminal detention litigation does not channel courts into a statutorily 
determined menu of responses. It thereby enables a study of courts’ remedial selections largely 
undistorted by most exogenous constraints.44  
Requests for judicial supervision in non-criminal detention cases after September 2001 
have taken four forms: injunctive relief granted before the government acts against an individual; 
injunctive relief granted to an individual after government has acted coercively; relief that 
restructures ongoing government operations (even if it is not in the technical form of a structural 
injunction); and damages remedies secured after a constitutional, statutory, or treaty right is 
violated. These four kinds of judicial relief diverge along several metrics. In opting between 
injunctions and damages, courts select between property rules and liability rules.45 Judges also 
toggle along a temporal scale between more or less ex ante or ex post interventions. They can 
allow either retail or wholesale interventions. Remedial choice is thus multifaceted and complex.   
A synoptic view of the consequences of federal courts’ intervention suggests that judicial 
selection of remedies in national security cases is asymmetrical. It is biased away from the 
granular toward the molar. Courts grant injunctive relief that disrupts and reorders the structure 
of entire government programs. They generally do not grant retail preliminary injunctive relief or 
individualized final injunctive remedies. Nor have litigants typically prevailed in suits for money 
damages pursuant to federal statutes, international law, or the Constitution. The post-9/11 
remedial distribution is thus tilted toward broad remediation and away from individually tailored 
equitable relief or remedies at law. To illustrate this, I survey first individualized injunctive relief 
and damages, and then turn to what might be termed the more “structural” forms of 
interventions. 
 
1. Individual injunctive relief 
 
Injunctive relief can be sought before coercive government action happens. The warrant 
requirement for surveillance is a well-known example of ex ante regulation. Warrant 
requirements in the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), 
as amended in July 2008, impel some limited prior judicial supervision of electronic surveillance 
in the national security context.46 Although a warrant rule may alter the pool of surveillance 
requests, evidence of recent changes to eavesdropping policy is hard to discern. Even under the 
                                                 
43 5 USC §§ 552 et seq.  
44 Remedies in national security detention cases will, however, be distorted by a selection effect because the 
executive will choose ex ante between legal forms of detention based on its estimation of the expected judicial 
response. To the extent that almost all forms of detention—criminal, administrative, and military—were tried in 
somewhat haphazard fashion after 9/11, this selection effect does not appear to preclude the comparative analysis 
proposed here.  
45 Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 Stan L Rev 755, 
757–762 (2004). The canonical delineation of the property/liability rule distinction is Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L 
Rev 1089 (1972). 
46 See, for example, FISA Amendments Act of 2008, § 702 (b)(1)–(5), Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436 (2008).  
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pre-2001, more stringent iteration of FISA, few warrants were denied.47 Federal courts also have 
rejected efforts to impose more rigorous ex ante regulation on electronic surveillance.48  
In non-criminal detention cases, ex ante remedies are vanishingly rare. No court has ever 
granted a remedy to an individual to prevent seizure or detention. Logistical difficulties 
obviously limit such remediation. Lawyers are scarce on the battlefield outside of law-school 
hypotheticals. In practical terms, government actors control and often can delay access to the 
courts for days or weeks. Despite the infrequency of ex ante intervention, the Supreme Court has 
in dicta disapproved of such relief. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, a plurality singled out “initial 
captures,” which “need not receive … process,” as distinct from the judicially regulated 
subsequent “determination[s] … to continue to hold those who have been seized.”49 Four years 
later, the Court underscored that same message to federal courts.50 As a practical and as a legal 
matter, federal courts are not now nor have they ever been in the business of regulating the direct 
application of coercion.  
By contrast, litigants who have been detained for some time do seek—and at one point 
fleetingly enjoyed—some ex ante relief from changes to the circumstances of ongoing 
confinement. But the availability of such relief is diminishing. Litigants detained at Guantánamo 
have sought relief from certain aspects of their confinement and from anticipated transfers to 
third countries. Citing fears of torture, some Guantánamo detainees from 2005 onward sought 
and sometimes secured judicial orders requiring the government to provide them with thirty 
days’ notice of any transfer from the base.51  However, more recent requests for notice have been 
denied on jurisdictional grounds.52 Similarly, requests for preliminary injunctive relief related to 
conditions of confinement and medical treatment have failed.53 
The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Munaf v Geren minimizes the likely availability 
of ex ante injunctions against transfers.54 In Munaf, the Court consolidated review of habeas 
petitions from two U.S. citizens seized and detained in Iraq. In one case, the detainee 
                                                 
47 Note, Shifting the FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil Liberties by Eliminating Ex Ante Judicial Approval, 121 Harv 
L Rev 2200, 2205–06 (2008). 
48 American Civil Liberties Union v National Security Agency, 493 F3d 644 (6th Cir 2007). 
49 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 534 (2004) (plurality) (emphasis in original). Hamdi’s presumption is 
undertheorized. One of the challenges of regulating detention policy is the ample space for government 
circumvention and evasion. The more one locus or form of detention is regulated, that is, the more the regulated 
activity will shift to policy spaces with lower transaction costs. Allowing habeas jurisdiction to attach at the moment 
of capture is one way of mitigating the circumvention problem, whatever its other costs.  
50 Boumediene v Bush, 553 US --, 128 S Ct 2207, 2275–76 (2008). 
51 See, for example, al-Shareef v Bush, No 05-2458, 2006 WL 3544736 (DDC Dec 8, 2006); Kurnaz v Bush, No 04-
1135, 2005 WL 839542 (DDC Apr 12, 2005); Al-Marri v Bush, No 04-2035, 2005 WL 774843 (DDC Apr 4, 2005). 
Cf Almurabi v Bush, 366 F Supp 2d 72 (DDC 2005) (denying preliminary injunction but requiring notice). But see 
O.K. v Bush, 377 F Supp 2d 102 (DDC 2005) (denying preliminary injunction). As of March 2006, one 
commentator identified twenty-seven pro-detainee decisions and six pro-government decisions. Robert Chesney, 
Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U Richmond L Rev 657, 667 (2006).  
52 See, for example, Zalita v Bush, 2007 WL 1183910 (DDC Apr. 19, 2007). 
53 See Al-Adahi v Obama, 596 F Supp 2d 111 (DDC 2009) (force-feeding); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
Litigation, 570 F Supp 2d 13 (DDC 2008) (intra-base transfers); Al-Ghizzawi v Bush, No 05-2378, 2008 WL 948337 
(DDC Apr 8, 2008) (medical treatment). 
54 128 S Ct 2207 (2008). Caveat lector: I was of counsel for habeas petitioners in this case,  
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successfully sought injunctive relief from lower courts against transfer to Iraqi criminal custody 
based on fears of torture.55 A unanimous Supreme Court not only chastised the lower court for 
granting preliminary injunctive relief but found it “appropriate to proceed further” to the merits 
issues not adjudicated below to hold that “the Constitution [does not] preclude[e] the Executive 
from transferring a prisoner to a foreign country for prosecution in an allegedly unconstitutional 
trial.”56 While Munaf does not directly concern transfers from Guantánamo Bay, its foreign-
policy-based deference to the executive’s third-country dealings sounds in general terms. As 
applied by the D.C. Circuit, it renders extensive ex ante judicial supervision of transfers from 
Guantánamo or elsewhere nugatory.57 Injunctive relief to prevent a harmful action, even long 
after an initial seizure, will thus likely remain a rarity. 
A second variety of injunctive remedy is sought after the government has taken coercive 
action against an individual in circumstances where that coercive action persists in time. 
Detention, most obviously, endures over time and is remedied by an injunction. Detainees 
typically seek injunctive relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus to dissolve ongoing 
detention and to secure release.   
Despite the volume and rancor of political and legal debate over the availability of habeas 
corpus for detainees situated outside the territorial United States, individualized habeas relief as a 
direct result of a federal court order remains elusive. As of January 2010, federal courts had 
issued final judgments finding no lawful detention authority in thirty-two cases. But, only eleven 
detainees had been released.58 A formal release order in a habeas case, therefore, is an uncertain 
predictor of de facto relief. Overall, 575 prisoners have been released from Guantánamo between 
2002 and January 2010.59 Final judgments in habeas cases were thus directly and proximately 
linked to relief in less than two percent of actual releases from Guantánamo. Implicitly 
recognizing this reality, district courts no longer direct release as a remedy but instead order “all 
necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate … release.”60   
 Habeas’s individualized efficacy is unlikely to grow with the transition from the Bush to 
the Obama Administration. One of the central policy puzzles related to the closure of the 
Guantánamo detention operation is how to release detainees who are unable to return to their 
home countries due to a substantial risk of torture. After Boumediene v Bush’s61 ruling on 
                                                 
55 Omar v Harvey, 416 F Supp 2d 19 (DDC 2006). 
56 Munaf, 128 S Ct at 2220.  
57 Accord Kiyemba v Obama, 561 F3d 509 (DC Cir 2009) (denying injunctive relief against transfers of 
Guantánamo detainees to possible torture based on Munaf). The government’s brief in opposition, filed in the 
Supreme Court in this litigation, largely rests on Munaf, but the Court has yet to determine whether it will review the 
case. See text accompanying note 64 (describing grant of certiorari in related case). 
58 For data and further analysis see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, -- Const Comm – (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 15). See also Chisun Lee, An Examination of 31 Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, Propublica (Sept 29, 
2009), online at http://www.propublica.org/special/an-examination-of-31-gitmo-detainee-lawsuits-722 (visited Feb 
15, 2010).  
59 Transferred--The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. Times, online at  
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/transferred (visited Feb 15, 2010). 
60 See, for example, Order, Al Rahiah v Gates, No 1:02-cv-00828-CKK (DDC Sept. 17, 2009), online at 
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2009/09/17/22/rabia.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf (visited Feb 17, 2010). 
61 128 S Ct 2229 (2008). 
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habeas’s availability at Guantánamo, both Congress and the federal courts imposed new 
impediments to individual injunctive remediation via habeas involving release into the United 
States. In Congress, for example, riders attached to 2009 appropriations legislation bar certain 
transfers from Guantánamo to the United States, and impose fifteen-day notice rules for transfers 
to third countries.62 Complicating the picture further, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
has also rejected release into the United States as a habeas remedy for detainees who cannot be 
transferred to third countries for fear of torture.63 That D.C. Circuit judgment may be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court in 2010.64 In short, doctrinal and legislative hurdles mean that, even in 
cases where a district court finds no lawful basis for detention and orders release, the habeas 
judgment as individual remedy will remain under-realized.    
 
2. “Structural” rulings  
 
There is a class of habeas cases in which federal courts have granted relief that has had 
the expected and realized consequence of transforming the institutional structure of a national 
security program in dramatic and wide-ranging ways. Individual petitioners do not, however, 
always benefit. The causal vector is largely indirect. Three cases in particular have intervened in 
ongoing security operations and wrought significant changes in the constraints to which the 
Government is subject.  The relief in these cases is somewhat akin to that achieved by a 
structural injunction.  
The first of these cases is Rasul v Bush,65 where the Court ruled that detainees seized at 
extraterritorial sites can challenge the legality of their detention in civilian courts and are not 
limited to the procedures that the military affords. (Boumediene v Bush merely reaffirmed the 
institutional rewiring achieved by Rasul and provided further specification of its geographic 
ambit.66) In the same term as Rasul, the Court in Hamdi displaced the then-existing procedural 
mechanism used to sort detainees and ordered the use of a vaguely defined but presumably more 
robust alternative.67 Whereas Rasul altered the institutional site of detainee screening, Hamdi 
prescribed details about the content of screening. The net effect of these two rulings was 
institutional transformation. Nine days after judgment in those cases, the Department of Defense 
announced a new, two-tier procedural apparatus at Guantánamo for the processing and 
designation of all detainees therein.68 This procedural apparatus aimed to conform to Hamdi’s 
                                                 
62 See, for example, Supplemental Appropriations Act 2009, Pub L No 111-32, HR 2346, § 14104(a) (2009) (“None 
of the funds made available in this or any prior Act may be used to release an individual who is detained as of the 
date of enactment of this Act, at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into the continental United States, Alaska, 
Hawaii, or the District of Columbia.”).   
63 Kiyemba v Obama, 555 F3d 1022 (DC Cir 2009). 
64 Kiyemba v Obama, -- S Ct – (Oct. 20, 2009) (granting writ of certiorari).   
65 542 US 466 (2004). 
66 128 S Ct 2229, 2259–63 (2008). See also Al Maqaleh v Gates, 604 F Supp 2d 205 (DDC 2009) (allowing some 
detainees at Bagram, Afghanistan to seek habeas relief).  
67 542 US 507, 527–34 (2004) (plurality). 
68 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Gordon R. England, Sec'y of the Navy (July 7, 
2004), online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (visited Feb 17, 2010). 
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direction by supplying internal process. The perceived price of institutional autonomy from 
judicial scrutiny was procedural reform and the attendant risk of further releases.  
In the third case, Hamdan v Rumsfeld,69 the Court again used an individual habeas 
petition as a vehicle for institutional transformation. Hamdan extinguished a November 2001 
executive initiative to establish military commissions for persons captured in overseas 
counterterrorism operations. In so doing, it set benchmarks for any new commission system. A 
pointed concurrence lingered on perceived democratic flaws in the commission’s original 
creation.70 The Court’s critique of military commissions further “depend[ed] explicitly on 
substantive concerns” about fairness and accuracy.71 The Hamdan decision set in motion another 
institutional transformation. Less than four months after the judgment, Congress enacted the 
Military Commission Act of 2006, in part responding to the Court’s critique with a rewired 
system of military tribunals.72 As with Rasul and Hamdi, an individual habeas action netted a 
significant institutional shake-up. But the Hamdan Court also went out of its way to stress the 
absence of individualized habeas relief.73  
The Hamdan Court’s structural reform ambitions went further than mere reorganization 
of military commissions. The decision also addressed questions of detainee treatment that had 
been a focus of public and legislative debate since 2004. Its effects thus rippled beyond the 
military. In a holding collateral to its main result, the Hamdan Court decreed that Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions74 extended to detainees at Guantánamo and beyond.75 
The majority likely knew that Common Article 3’s prohibition on “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” had a direct bearing on interrogation 
and detention practices separate from the procedural issues at stake in Hamdan. As President 
Bush explained, the Court’s reorientation of the benchmarks for interrogation “put in question” 
operations by diverse agencies, including the CIA, which had not been party to the Hamdan 
litigation.76  
Hamdan’s Common Article 3 holding catalyzed further institutional transformation. 
Eight days after the judgment, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing 
                                                 
69 548 US 557 (2006). 
70 Id at 613–35. See also id at 637 (Breyer, with Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, concurring). 
71 Martinez, 108 Colum L Rev at 1056 (cited in note 40).  
72 Pub L No 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 USC). New military 
commissions are authorized in § 3(a)(1) of the Act, codified at 10 USC § 948b(b).  
73Hamdan, 548 US at 635 (noting “the Government’s continued power to detain [Hamdan] for the duration of active 
hostilities”).  
74 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug 12, 1949, Art 3, 75 UNTS 135, 136. 
Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions uses common language to articulate a baseline set of norms for 
“conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” Id.  
75 Hamdan, 548 US at 632. The Court had already held that the military commissions at issue violated Articles 21 
and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id at 624–25.  
76 President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists 
(Sept 6, 2006), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060906-3.html (on file with 
author). The ambit of Common Article 3 had long been of concern to the Administration. See David J. Barron and 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-In-Chief at the Lowest Ebb--Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 Harv L Rev 689, 707 n 48 (2008) (describing 2002 Justice Department suggestion that 
application of Common Article 3 to counterterrorism operations might infringe Article II powers of the President). 
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all services to conform to Common Article 3.77 A year later, this instruction was superseded by a 
presidential directive setting forth a more reticulated understanding of Common Article 3.78 
Hamdan, therefore, began an extended sequence of changes to the terms and conditions of 
detainee treatment and interrogation not only by the armed services at Guantánamo, but more 
broadly by all federal agencies at diverse geographic locations. An unexpected collateral effect 
has been to push interrogation operations into the hands of allied countries, such as Pakistan and 
Egypt, with fewer restraints on torture or illegal treatment.79 This globalized displacement effect 
has been little analyzed.80  
 
3. Damages 
 
 Numerous suits for money damages have been lodged against the government in respect 
to non-criminal detentions after the 9/11 attacks. Several of these proceeded under the Bivens 
right of action.81 Others rested on statutory rights of action, including the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act82 and the Torture Victim Protection Act.83 No case to date has advanced under 
the generally available vehicle for federal tort liability, the Federal Tort Claims Act. 84 Almost all 
damages suits challenging extraterritorial detention operations failed. In the domestic arena, 
challenges to policies and patterns of detention and arrest also have failed, but some actions 
seeking damages for ambient abuse or discrimination by low-level officials have proceeded to 
discovery, or, in a couple of instances, have settled. At best, damages actions provide a means to 
challenge isolated acts of abuse, but no avenue for effecting larger programmatic change. The 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Iqbal will have little effect on this basic picture.  
                                                 
77 Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, on the Application of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense to Department of Defense 
Officials (July 7, 2006), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/geneva070606.pdf (visited Feb 17, 2010). 
Deputy Secretary England claimed that this involved no change in policy, which is a stretch.  
78 Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and 
Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, Exec Order No 13340, 72 Fed Reg 40707 (2007). 
79 See Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, US Relies More on Aid of Allies in Terrorism Cases, NY Times (May 23, 
2009).  
80 See Huq, -- Const Comm (cited in note 58) (discussing displacement effects).  
81 See Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971). Bivens 
established a private right of action for damages under the Fourth Amendment.  
82 42 USC §§ 2000bb et seq. See, for example, Rasul v Myers, 563 F3d 527, 532–33 (DC Cir 2009) cert denied – S. 
Ct – (Dec 14, 2009). 
83 28 USC §1350 note; see, for example, Arar v Ashcroft, 532 F3d 157, 162 (2d Cir 2008).  
84 The absence of claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 USC §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680, is a result 
of statutory exceptions that encompass most national security-related torts, including “[a]ny claim arising out of the 
combatant activities of the military or naval forces during time of war,” §2680(j); many claims arising out of 
“assault, battery, false imprisonment [or] false arrest,” §2680(h); and “any claim arising in a foreign country,” 
§2680(k), and any claim based on “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function,” §2680(a), which shields most discretionary policy judgments. Individual suits are no substitute for actions 
against the United States because of the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Compensation Act, or Westfall 
Act, see Pub L No 100-694, 102 Stat.4563 (1988), which allows the United States to be substituted for individual 
officer defendants sued for actions taken within the scope of their employment, and thereafter channels suit into the 
FTCA.  
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 Before Iqbal, damages actions arose in response to five different kinds of detention 
decisions. First, federal law enforcement authorities used the “material witness” statute to detain 
at least seventy suspects in relation to terrorism investigations across the United States.85 Two 
sued. One, Brandon Mayfield, a Portland, Oregon, lawyer erroneously detained in relation to the 
March 2004 Madrid bombings, secured a two million dollar settlement after it emerged that 
forensic evidence upon which his arrest had been made was grossly flawed.86 Another sought 
damages for his detention from federal and state officials, overcoming motions to dismiss by 
defendant former Attorney General John Ashcroft.87 This result is arguably in some tension with 
the new and more stringent pleading rules specified in Iqbal and discussed below.  
The second kind of domestic detention—in military custody via “enemy combatant” 
designation—was rare, even among the wave of first responses to 9/11. Among the three “enemy 
combatants” detained in the United States, one waived his right to sue as a condition of release.88 
The only one to sue for damages, Jose Padilla, aimed at a former government lawyer in one law 
suit based on allegations that the lawyer played an instrumental role in designing torturous 
interrogation protocols.89 The action survived a post-Iqbal motion to dismiss based on the 
alleged insufficiency of the allegations.90 The ensuing decision is a possibly vulnerable outlier. 
While citing Iqbal, the district court did not analyze extensively the effect of that case on 
pleading rules.    
 Third, the government used immigration powers in its post-9/11 investigation to detain at 
least 750 non-citizen suspects pending inquiry by the FBI. Immigrants detained in that period, 
whether clearly linked to the attacks or not, were ranked by varying degrees of “interest.” To 
enable continuing FBI investigations, some were subject to continued detention even after being 
cleared of immigration-related charges. Conditions of confinement were significantly harsher 
than those in routine immigration custody. During the ensuing detentions, some non-citizens 
endured physical or verbal abuse, as well as denials of access to legal counsel or medical care.91 
Suits arising from this program of immigration detention challenged both policy decisions and 
discrete, dispersed, and individualized acts of discrimination and abuse. Iqbal, discussed further 
below, barred suits against policy-makers, but left open the possibility of suits against rank-and-
                                                 
85 18 USC § 3144; Human Rights Watch, Witness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses under the Material Witness Law 
since September 11 at 16 (June 2005).  
86 Eric Lichtblau, US Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed, NY Times (Nov 30, 2006).  
87 See Al-Kidd v Ashcroft, -- F3d --, 2009 WL 2836448 (9th Cir Sept 4, 2009) (denying qualified immunity). See 
also Al-Kidd v Gonzales, No CV 05-093-EJL-MHW, 2006 WL 5429570 (D Id Sept 27, 2006); Al-Kidd v Gonzales, 
No CV 05-093-EJL-MHW, 2008 WL 2795137 (D Id July 17, 2008) (dismissing conditions claims). 
88 Motion of Defendant to Stay Proceedings, Hamdi v Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439 ¶ 13 (ED Va Sept 24, 2004), online 
at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/hamdi_briefs/Hamdi_Agreement.pdf (visited Feb 17, 2010). 
89 See Complaint, Padilla v Yoo, No. 08-CV-0035 (ND Cal Jan 4, 2008), online at  
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/YooComplaint.pdf (visited Feb 17, 2010). 
90 Padilla v Yoo, 633 F Supp 2d 1005 (ND Cal 2009). 
91 See generally US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The September 11 Detainees: A Review 
of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 
Attacks 2-5 (April 2003), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm.  
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file officials.92 A companion case concerning similarly unsanctioned abuse during confinement 
settled in part for $300,000.93 In another action, the federal courts dismissed challenges to the 
lawfulness of arrests—an issue going to investigative strategies—while allowing conditions 
claims to proceed to discovery.94   
Fourth, military operations outside the United States have generated a significant volume 
of long-term detainees. The latter are either held by the U.S. Government (e.g., in Guantánamo) 
or transferred to cooperating foreign governments. Detention operations at Guantánamo, in Iraq, 
and in Afghanistan have led to damages litigation. Unlike domestic actions, where challenges to 
conditions have gained some traction, these suits uniformly fail. Federal courts dismiss the 
complaints on the theory that plaintiff-detainees held overseas lack constitutional rights that can 
be vindicated via a damages action or because defendants benefit from qualified immunity.95 The 
final and related category of suits involves detention that is outsourced to foreign sovereign 
proxies or moved to CIA “black sites.” Two actions against government officials based on 
detention in a CIA “black site” and in the proxy custody of another sovereign (Syria) have been 
rejected based respectively on the “state secrets” doctrine and the “special factors” exception to 
Bivens liability.96 By contrast, a suit against private companies allegedly involved in the same 
program survived dismissal efforts grounded on the state secrets doctrine but will be subject to 
vigorous attack via appellate review.97   
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal will do little to change the daunting obstacles facing 
plaintiffs in these cases. Iqbal emerges from the third category: immigration detention. Javaid 
Iqbal, a Pakistani national, was arrested by FBI and immigration agents in November 2001 and 
detained in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Manhattan. In January 2002, he was transferred 
to a high-security unit called the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (the “ADMAX 
SHU”), where he remained until July 2002. In April 2002, Iqbal pleaded guilty to federal 
criminal charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud in relation to identification 
documents. He was released in January 2003 and deported to Pakistan.98 In May 2004, Iqbal 
filed damages actions against 34 current and former government officials. He did not challenge 
                                                 
92 Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1952 (2009) (“Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal alleges serious official 
misconduct that we need not address here.”). 
93 Iqbal v Hasty, 490 F3d 143, 147 (2d Cir 2007) rev’d sub nom Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 (2009). 
94 Turkmen v Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307, 2006 WL 1662663 *1 (EDNY June 14, 2006) aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 589 F3d 542 (2d Cir 2009) (per curiam). Under the Second Circuit’s ruling, the plaintiffs in the Turkmen case 
can pursue conditions challenges but not challenges to the duration of their confinement.  
95 See Rasul v Myers, 563 F3d 527 (D.C. Cir 2009) cert denied – S. Ct. – (Dec 14, 2009) (after vacatur of an earlier 
judgment by the Supreme Court in light of Boumediene, reinstalling dismissal of constitutional, international law, 
and statutory causes of actions lodged by former Guantánamo detainees); In re: Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees 
Litigation, 479 F Supp 2d 85 (DDC 2007) (same for military detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan). Suits against 
private contractors not operating under exclusive military control have prevailed against motions for summary 
judgment. See Ibrahim v Titan Corp, 556 F Supp 2d 1, 10 (DDC 2007) (distinguishing claims based on degree of 
military control). 
96 El-Masri v Tenet, 479 F3d 296, 308–11 (4th Cir 2007) (dismissal based on “state secrets” doctrine); Arar v 
Ashcroft, 585 F3d 559 (2d Cir 2009) (in banc) (dismissing suit based on insufficiency of allegations and absence of 
Bivens remedy). 
97 Mohamed v Jeppeson Dataplan, Inc, 563 F3d 992, 997, en banc review granted 586 F3d 1108 (9th Cir 2009). 
98 See Iqbal v Hasty, 490 F3d 143, 147–49 (2d Cir 2007). 
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the legality of his initial arrest. His complaint instead alleged discriminatory assignment to the 
ADMAX SHU and unconstitutional beatings and denial of medical care. By the time his case 
reached the Supreme Court, the district court had rejected statutory claims of religious 
discrimination and conspiracy,99 while the court of appeals had knocked out Iqbal’s due process 
claims.100 The Supreme Court granted plenary review to former Attorney General John Ashcroft 
and FBI director Robert Muller.101  
 Writing for a five-Justice majority Justice Kennedy reversed the Second Circuit to hold 
that Iqbal had failed to plead sufficient facts to meet the pleading standard of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).102 Some background is necessary to understand this procedural ruling. 
Rule 8(a)(2) was long understood to establish notice pleading in federal civil practice.103 Its 
drafters intended to “escape the complexities of fact pleading” under common law rules by 
opening wide the federal courthouse door and relying on post-discovery sorting to eliminate low-
value suits.104 The Court previously had rejected lower-court attempts to impose heightened 
pleading standards or new burdens of proof.105 But in a 2007 antitrust action, the Court changed 
course. It held that district courts must ascertain whether a complaint supports a “plausible” 
inference of liability in antitrust actions.106 Muddying the waters further, another decision weeks 
later flipped back to the familiar notice pleading formulation.107 Summarizing the resulting 
guidance to lower courts, Judge Cabranes of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decried the law 
of pleading as “less than crystal clear and fully deserv[ing] reconsideration by the Supreme Court 
at the earliest opportunity.”108  
In response, the Iqbal Court held that the “plausibility” standard first suggested in 2007 
was not confined to antitrust but applied generally to federal civil litigation. It established a two-
stage test for “plausibility” presumptively applicable to all federal civil suits. First, a court should 
discard all “legal conclusions” and “mere conclusory statements” in a complaint. Second, it 
should ascertain if what remains “states a plausible claim of relief” in “context” by drawing on 
“judicial experience and common sense.”109 Applying this test, the Court reversed the court of 
                                                 
99 Elmaghraby v Ashcroft, 04-CV-1409, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 21434 *95–*109 (EDNY Sept 27, 2005). 
100 Iqbal, 490 F3d at 160–68. 
101 Compare Ashcroft v Iqbal, 554 US --, 128 S Ct 2931 (2008) (granting certiorari), with Hasty v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 
2430 (2009) (granting and remanding in light of the Court’s opinion in Iqbal).  
102 Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”   
103 See Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”). 
104 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum L Rev 
433, 433, 437–40 (1986). 
105 See, for example, Crawford-El v Miller, 523 US 574, 593–95 (1998) . 
106 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 556 (2007).  
107 Erickson v Pardus, 551 US 89, 93–94 (2007) (per curiam). 
108 Iqbal v Hasty, 490 F3d 143, 178 (2d Cir 2007) (Cabranes concurring). 
109 Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1949–50 (2009).  
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appeals’ judgment and remanded for determination whether Iqbal should be allowed to 
replead.110  
Putatively a case about an emergency national security policy, Iqbal will not change any 
trend in national security damages litigation. Plaintiffs in such cases already face a thicket of 
procedural hurdles from categorical exceptions to Bivens liability to the “state secrets” privilege 
to qualified and absolute immunity. These threshold doctrines already direct dismissal before 
discovery. By raising pleading standards, Iqbal does not change even the timing of likely 
dismissal. It just endorses a new legal theory on which dismissal may be grounded.111 The basic 
pattern will remain the same: Challenges against discrete, isolated, and unauthorized acts of 
abuse sometimes prevail, but suits targeting allegedly unconstitutional policies will be turned 
away at the courthouse door.  As discussed in more detail below, Iqbal’s effect on general civil 
litigation, however, was immediate and dramatic, in striking contrast to its consequences for the 
local domain of national security cases.112 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
A pattern emerges from this survey of post-9/11 case law about detention programs. 
Private litigants prevail in actions for what are de facto structural injunctions (although they do 
not have that technical legal form), which catalyze significant structural change in national 
security programs but yield few proximate benefits for the named petitioners. But private 
litigants meet limited or no success in seeking more tailored ex ante or ex post retail injunctions. 
Damages actions also are generally unavailing, except in a scattering of cases challenging 
discrete, isolated, and unauthorized acts of abuse or discrimination. Iqbal may render damages 
actions incrementally less likely to prevail . It is hard to see, though, this difference having much 
practical significance in the national security domain.  
 
 
                                                 
110 Before reaching the pleading question, the Court also confirmed the availability of interlocutory jurisdiction. 
Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1945–49 (2009). It then held that supervisory liability based on a defendant’s 
“knowledge and acquiescence” was not available, at least for intentional government torts, an argument that 
prompted a lengthy reply by Justice Souter, who argued that the majority had overlooked the defendants’ concession 
on this point. Compare id at 1948 with id at 1955–-58 (Souter dissenting). 
111 Seemingly contrary to this view are the results in both Al-Kidd and Padilla. But these cases do not alter the basic 
fact of Iqbal’s inconsequentiality for national security. As an initial matter, it is unclear how to count decisions, such 
as Al-Kidd and Padilla, which do not grapple seriously with Iqbal’s reformulation of the pleading standard. Even if 
these cases are indicative of future trends—which seems doubtful—they are evidence that Iqbal is opaque and that 
its two-stage doctrinal rule is easy to circumvent. Just as some lower courts for years resisted the Supreme Court’s 
direction to hew to notice pleading, see Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex L Rev 551, 552 
(2002), so now that the Court has pivoted to fact pleading other lower courts will resist the transition. It is not only 
that the judiciary is “a they, not an it,” but that the “they” is saddled with imperfect mechanisms of internal doctrinal 
discipline. Cf Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 
14 J Contemp L Issues 549, 554 (2005) (“Empirically, it is often costly or simply infeasible for the judiciary to 
coordinate upon a particular course of action, and to sustain that coordination to the degree necessary to affect the 
behavior of other institutions and actors.”). 
112 See text accompanying notes 189 to 196. 
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C. 
 
 What can be learned from a comparison of the observed consequences of judicial 
intervention in exigent non-criminal detention policies with the patterns of judicial action 
described in or extrapolated from the five, largely normative theories above?  A faithful 
explanation of the federal courts’ role in national security must explain both judicial parsimony 
in ex ante injunctions and damages actions and also the more ample role of courts in issuing de 
facto “structural” injunctions that affect whole national security programs. If one of the five 
descriptive accounts outlined in Part I.A captured the observed distribution of results, this would 
be evidence it had isolated a distinctive dynamic motivating judicial outcomes in these particular 
national security cases. But none of the theories achieves this goal.   
 
1. The social learning thesis 
 
The social learning thesis does not easily cash out into any expected pattern of remedial 
outcomes. It operates across history and does not select between contemporary remedial options. 
It predicts synchronic variance between judicial and elite consensus will be small. Courts, 
therefore, will generally accord deference to claims of necessity but resist claims of government 
power that track or echo historically discredited models. Taking social learning seriously, courts 
after 9/11 would resist measures that resembled past discredited security efforts, while accepting 
innovations. Dissents from today’s decisions that endorse novel security responses would one 
day be celebrated as prescient when new information emerges about the flaws in current security 
programs.  
But, this account does not describe well the actual outcomes and it casts little light on the 
differential treatment of narrow versus broad-gauge remedies. As the basis for the claim that 
national security jurisprudence is exceptional, that is, the social learning thesis provides scant 
support. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has done little to cabin the use of race-based or 
ethnicity-based criteria as proxies for dangerousness, despite the aversive precedent of 
Korematsu. To be sure, the absence of a post-9/11 mass internment of Muslim-Americans might 
be credited to the “social learning” of Korematsu. Another explanation would focus on 
differences in political economy. In the World War II internment, rival agricultural interests 
eager for land were an important motivating force for a round-up of ethnic Japanese living on the 
west coast.113 The absence of similar interest group pressure on the east coast explains the 
absence of German or Italian internment later in World War II, and may also better explain the 
absence of Muslim-American internment today.  
Nor does Iqbal fit the social learning thesis. In hindsight, Korematsu at a minimum 
suggests that governments, after a security crisis, often act on the basis of invidious or inaccurate 
generalizations about disfavored minorities. Yet the Iqbal Court not only makes bias 
significantly harder to police, it also rests on carelessly racialized reasoning that even the 
                                                 
113 Stone, Perilous Times, at 292–93 (cited in note 7).  
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government as litigator eschewed.  As an initial matter, the Iqbal majority was cavalier about the 
risk of ambient animus distorting discrete outcomes in a national crisis. Leaning on his 
“experience and common sense,” Justice Kennedy rejected out of hand circumstantial evidence 
of discriminatory intent in Iqbal’s case. Noting that the 9/11 attacks were “perpetrated by 19 
Arab Muslim hijackers … members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist 
group … headed by another Arab Muslim,” he asserted that it came as “no surprise” that 
responsive policies had “a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.”114 “Common sense 
and experience” here served to deny Iqbal even the opportunity to identify bias through 
discovery.  
Further, Justice Kennedy’s logic is itself based on dubious premises about ethnicity and 
religion. As Judge Jon O. Newman explained in his opinion for the Second Circuit, “Iqbal is a 
Muslim and a Pakistani but not an Arab…. [H]is claim is fairly to be understood as alleging 
unlawful treatment … because officials believed, perhaps because of his appearance and his 
ethnicity, that he was an Arab.”115 Categorizing a Pakistani as an Arab, as Justice Kennedy does, 
is about as accurate as calling an American “European” based on a perception of shared ethnic 
heritage.116 The Court’s opinion thus rests on the very act of plainly erroneous racial mis-
categorization that Iqbal attacked as invidious. In short, it is not only that the “social learning” 
thesis provides little basis for predicting or understanding observed results in the case law but 
that Iqbal in particular casts doubt on whether the Court has learned much from its less noble 
history. 
 
2. The heroic model 
 
The heroic model is typically more aspirational than descriptive. If the heroic model is 
understood to rest on the assumption that democratic decision-making under emergency pressure 
will tilt toward animus-inflected error, either along racial or ideological lines, then federal courts 
should police resulting policies vigorously, applying searching scrutiny to check their rationality. 
Recognizing that money damages fall short as a substitute for incommensurable constitutional 
entitlements,117 at a minimum because of valuation difficulties, advocates of the heroic model 
might tilt toward ex ante solutions without abandoning residual judicial review via damages 
actions. The most insightful advocates of the heroic model, of course, are not Pollyannaish. They 
recognize that political constraints bind judges and that emergencies raise hard policy 
                                                 
114Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1951 (2009).  
115 Id. Iqbal v Hasty, 490 F3d 143, 148 n 2 (2d Cir 2007).  
116 Justice Kennedy may be implying that possession of a religious identity—Muslim—suffices to warrant suspicion 
when it comes to terrorism today. But even the government’s brief is careful to reject so sweeping a claim about 
religious identity. See Br For Pet’rs’ in Ashcroft v Iqbal, No 07-1015, Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 (2009), at 31 
(carefully refusing to contend that religious identity is a trait legitimately useful in investigations). 
117 Cf Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247 (1978) (allowing award of nominal damages for procedural due process 
violation); see also Memphis Community School District v Stachura, 477 US 299 (1986) (rejecting valuation of 
abstract value of constitutional right). 
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questions.118 As a result, they may endorse some judicial hesitation to intervene by ex ante or 
even in media res injunctions. 
But the result and reasoning of Iqbal, alongside the larger vacuum in damages actions, 
are difficult to square with a counter-majoritarian thesis. Reliance on structural injunctions alone 
seems radically underinclusive of the heroic model’s goals. That model also struggles with the 
absence of individualized injunctive relief.  It thus may well be that the heroic model identifies 
one important feature of judicial thinking and strategy, but it also underplays the complex 
influence and interaction of other factors. The heroic model therefore cannot underwrite a 
descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism.  
 
3.  The executive accommodation model 
 
Executive accommodationists favor roughly the opposite distribution of remedial 
outcomes from the heroic model. They will reject out of hand ex ante or in media res judicial 
interventions. They also will be leery of constitutional tort litigation to the extent it limits future 
options by articulating new constitutional norms to constrain subsequent executives. 
Emergencies are unpredictable along multiple axes; it is impossible ex ante to determine what 
rules will be bent in the next one.119 Yet accommodationists may also see utility in compensation 
if it can be separated from the norm-enunciation function of constitutional tort. They “fully 
agree” that “decisionmakers should at minimum take pains to commemorate the values or rights 
or interests that [were] overridden in the service of other commitments.”120 Indeed, if courts 
adjudicate damages actions after some lapse of time—which is inevitable given the glacial pace 
of civil litigation in federal courts121—then information asymmetries and the comparative cost of 
judicial examination and correction may have waned in the interim. The emergency itself is also 
more likely to have expired.122  
The outcomes of cases decided since 9/11 do not converge on this pattern. To be sure, the 
observed pattern of remedies and their consequences illustrates federal courts’ identification and 
insulation of a zone of discretion at the point of first contact between government and a threat. 
This explains the absence of ex ante remedies and the courts’ reluctance, so manifest in Iqbal, to 
chill front-end discretionary decision-making.123 To the extent that the executive accommodation 
theory suggests that the role of courts trends stronger as time elapses after an emergency, that 
                                                 
118 See Stone, Perilous Times at 544 (cited in note 8); David Cole, “Strategies of the Weak”: Thinking Globally and 
Acting Locally Toward a Progressive Constitutional Vision, in J.M. Balkin and R. B. Siegel, eds, The Constitution 
in 2020 at 297, 299–300, 306 (Oxford 2009). 
119 Cf Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 18, 169 (cited in note 8) (noting that Congress may have “little 
information about the nature of future emergencies”).  
120 Id at 296 n 9. 
121 See Nken v Holder, 129 S Ct 1749, 1754 (2009). 
122 See Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 Stan L Rev 163, 191 (2008). Since damages actions look back 
to past actions temporally proximate to the emergency, rather than examining continuing policies, they are not a 
form of “ex post sunsetting” whereby judges rescind emergency powers once they determine that as a matter of fact 
the emergency has elapsed. Id.  
123 Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1953 (2009). 
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theory finds little support in the judicial treatment of damages liability. Also, judicial 
remediation to date has clustered around the most invasive form of intervention—structural 
injunctions—while more tailored options have been slighted. That result obviously cannot be 
accounted for by a thesis of deference.  
 
4. National security minimalism 
 
In its tripartite form of clear statement rule, hearing rights, and decisional thinness, 
minimalism is offered as a template that “to a remarkable degree, captures the practices of the 
American courts when national security is threatened.”124 National security minimalism does not, 
however, predict well the overall pattern of remedies in national security cases. Courts have 
foregone tailored individual remedies, whether ex ante or ex post, in favor of quasi-structural 
injunctions in Hamdi, Hamdan, Rasul, and Boumediene. Rather than just changing conditions for 
one litigant, these decisions have each prompted institutional transformation in large national 
security programs. Hamdan’s Common Article 3 holding in particular rewired not only military 
commission policy but also interrogation policy. The Court thus opted for wide-bore remedial 
strategies over a narrow approach. Its interventions disrupted government operations beyond the 
case at hand. Judicial responses in the national security context, that is, have been maximalist in 
important ways.  
 The ruling in Iqbal is also hard to square with minimalism along several dimensions. 
First, the Court’s grant of certiorari was unusual125 insofar as there was no clear conflict among 
the circuits on either question presented,126 and the second question challenged a theory of 
government tort liability—supervisory liability by constructive notice—that had not been raised 
by the plaintiffs or decided below.127 A truly minimalist Court would rather incline against 
review where legal issues do not cleanly fit Supreme Court Rule 10’s criteria for review.128 The 
votes for certiorari review in Iqbal, indeed, seemed driven less by the legal issues presented than 
by the identity of the petitioners.129 Second, the majority opinion cannot be described as 
minimalist. It swept broadly by possibly eliminating supervisory liability in damages actions 
against government officials for violations of constitutional rights.130 Even more significantly, it 
                                                 
124 Sunstein, 2004 Sup Ct Rev at 50–51 (cited in note 11). 
125 A grant of certiorari is always unusual: In the 2007 Term, only 1.1% of the 8374 petitions filed led to review. The 
Statistics, 122 Harv L Rev 522, 523 (2008). 
126 Compare Pet for Cert No 01-1015, Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 (2009) at i (listing questions presented) with, 
Sup Ct R 10 (listing grounds for review by certiorari). The petition strained to identify a conflict in the circuits on 
the pleading standard and did not assert that the conflict was the primary ground for granting review. See Pet for 
Cert at 18–21. 
127 See Br in Opp No. 01-1015, Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 (2009) at 28–29.  
128 Rule 10(a) and 10(b) refer to divisions of opinion between courts the Supreme Court supervises respecting 
federal law; 10(c) covers “important question[s] of federal law.” 
129 The petition is larded with references to the petitioners’ ranks and the importance of being “a cabinet-level 
official or other high-ranking official.” Pet for Cert in Ashcroft v Iqbal, No. 07-1015, 129 S Ct 1937 (2009), at i.  
130 See supra note 110. Justice Kennedy’s opinion is not wholly clear on this. But see Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 
1937, 1957 (2009) (Souter dissenting) (“Lest there be any mistake … the majority is not narrowing the scope of 
supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”).  
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reordered pleading rules for federal civil actions in a manner that likely will generate future 
uncertainty and disparities between district courts. Third, the Iqbal Court resolved the pleading 
dispute on broader factual and legal grounds than those suggested by defendant-petitioners. The 
Court could have side-stepped the problem of racial or religious bias in law enforcement by 
picking up on the uncontested fact, raised by defendants’ brief, that 578 of the 762 detainees 
targeted by the investigation were not identified as being of “high interest” or placed in the 
ADMAX SHU.131 That is, it could have looked to uncontested facts as a means to respond to 
Iqbal’s claim of bias. Despite its claims to descriptive success in the national security domain, 
minimalism thus fails to provide an accurate characterization of either the overall pattern of 
outcomes or specific results such as Iqbal.  
 
5. Bilateral institutional endorsement 
 
 Like other accounts, bilateral institutional endorsement is presented as both descriptively 
accurate and normatively appealing.132 Indeed, in his separate Hamdan concurrence, Justice 
Breyer invited renewed democratic deliberation in terms that echo this theory’s logic.133 Yet, as 
with the other dominant theoretical accounts, bilateral institutional endorsement does not 
generate sound predictions for two reasons. First, democratic deliberation has not been the 
touchstone that the theory suggests. Second, the theory itself lacks predictive force because it 
contains no account of when or why courts should find democratic deliberation inadequate.  
 The first problem is that bilateral institutional endorsement does not well explain 
constitutional rulings in cases such as Hamdi and Boumediene. The theory’s proponents claim 
that Boumediene can be assimilated into this model as “an explication of the structural 
mechanisms that preserve” rights.134  Yet the Boumediene Court rejected the twice-considered 
judgment of Congress that plenary habeas jurisdiction over Guantánamo was neither wise nor 
necessary. The Court not only found inadequate the jurisdictional scheme designed by the 
political branches but did so without even allowing that scheme to be tested and found wanting. 
Extending rights under the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause to detainees, the 
Court materially reduced the policy space of the political branches in the teeth of considered and 
repeated deliberative exercises of the democratic will.  
The second, more serious, concern with bilateral institutional endorsement’s descriptive 
claim is its indeterminacy. Many cases in the national security domain, including Hamdi, 
Hamdan, and Rasul, hinge on whether a long-standing statute authorizes the executive branch to 
establish a novel policy that could not have been anticipated by the enacting Congress. The Court 
on occasion finds bilateral endorsement in statutory ambiguity.135 Other times, it rejects 
innovation based on the absence of sufficient endorsement. Bilateral institutional endorsement 
                                                 
131 Br for Petrs in Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 (2009) at 33 n 4.  
132 Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 at 5 (cited in note 10). 
133 Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer concurring).  
134 Issacharoff 29 Oxford J Legal Stud at 211 (cited in note 35).  
135 See, for example, Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 518 (2004) (plurality). 
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supplies no theory to explain when and how the Court should read ambiguous statutes to support 
an innovative policy. Without this baseline, it cannot generate predictions in the large number of 
cases in which the Court is confronted by a claim of bilateral action grounded in legislative 
language of uncertain relevance.136 Nor does the theory well explain what the Court has in fact 
done in the face of an ambiguous statute. In Hamdi, the relevant baseline seemed to be built of 
“fundamental and accepted … incident[s] of war.”137 But this term is far more opaque than 
district courts or commentators have recognized.138 In Hamdan, the Court looked to a complex, 
and not entirely pellucid, blend of historical practice and statutory authorization. The Court may 
have a baseline in mind, in other words, but it may be a mutable and only partially 
conceptualized one that bilateral institutional endorsement does little to illuminate.    
 Analysis of Iqbal and the damages cases through the lens of bilateral institutional 
endorsement suffers from the same drawback: It is impossible to determine what the baseline is 
against which the Court should view the availability of a Bivens damages remedy. On the one 
hand, the Court might believe that Congress has acquiesced to the availability of a Bivens 
remedy because “‘where federally protected rights have been invaded it has been the rule from 
the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies.’”139 On the other hand, Congress 
might be presumed to recognize that today “the Court is reluctant to extend Bivens liability.”140 
Absent some account of what the appropriate baseline is in damages actions, bilateral 
institutional endorsement cannot generate a meaningful prediction of results in damages cases 
any more than it yields forecasts of judicial responses to executive action resting on other 
marginal claims to statutory authority.   
 
D. 
 
 To summarize, five accounts of judicial responses to new national security policies can 
be identified in the current literature. Each makes a claim of descriptive fit as well as normative 
persuasion. Each singles out a unique judicial response to national security emergencies based on 
its understanding of what makes the policy environment after such an emergency distinct. But, a 
review of the federal courts’ remedial decisions in post-9/11 non-criminal detention cases 
suggests that none of these accounts yields a fully satisfying explanation of what courts are 
                                                 
136 Issacharoff and Pildes do not miss this problem; they implicitly recognize it when they discuss whether to treat an 
ambiguous statute as authorization for a contentious executive action. See Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq 
L 1 at 38–39 (cited in note 10). 
137 Hamdi, 542 US at 518 (plurality). 
138 The baseline is explored in Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 Harv L Rev 2047 (2005). 
139 Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 392 (1971) (quoting Bell 
v Hood, 327 US 678, 684 (1946)). 
140 Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937, 1948 (2009). This was as true of the Rehnquist Court as the Roberts Court. 
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doing. This result provides a first reason for doubting the descriptive power of national security 
exceptionalism.141  
 
II. 
 
This Part develops a second reason for skepticism about national security exceptionalism. 
I argue first that the gap between judicial responses to national security emergencies and other 
problems of constitutional compliance within complex institutions and policies has been 
overstated. To a surprising degree, remedies in national security cases correspond to remedies in 
other areas of public law where federal courts have grappled with complex state institutions. I 
then examine one set of judicial responses to the financial crisis of 2008–09 to see whether 
courts behave differently in security and non-security emergencies.  
 
A. 
 
Federal courts have developed a distinctive set of rules and remedies in enforcing 
constitutional entitlements in policing, prisons, mental institutions, and education. While 
generalized accounts of this particular body of public law are sparse, some regularities are 
evident.  In the larger corpus of public law, it is possible to discern trends in ex ante injunctions, 
ex post release via habeas, damages liability, and structural remedies. Examination of each of 
these four areas suggests that the judicial approach to national security is not as distinct as is 
generally believed from other public law domains. In both national security and general public 
law, there is an asymmetry between scarce-on-the-ground individual remedies and structural 
judicial orders that effectively re-organize government institutions. Benefiting a discrete litigant 
at bar is of secondary concern in both domains. Thus, common explanations may underlie 
judicial responses to exigent government programs in both national security and other public law 
domains.   
Why are there such strong similarities between the remedies in national security cases 
and those in other public law cases? There are several possible explanations. It may be that 
judges model, either consciously or instinctively, their remedial strategies on familiar approaches 
in public law (an effect amplified perhaps via precedential learning). Or it may be that screening 
devices at the courthouse door select for similar kinds of cases in the two domains. Alternatively, 
and more promisingly in my view, the correlation may be explained by reputational or other 
judicial motivations that reach across substantive doctrinal boundaries. But construction of a 
                                                 
141 One possible response to this argument might go as follows. Even if taken individually none of these theories has 
explanatory power alone, in the aggregate they encompass all the reasons courts have to act. Hence, their 
cumulative force is explanatory. I am not convinced. In the absence of some algorithm to assign weights to and then 
aggregate these competing and irreconcilable accounts, the argument from aggregation is question-begging. I do not 
doubt that different judges are responding in different ways to the concerns raised by the five theories, or that 
collegial decision-making might be characterized by cycling or unstable outcomes. I am merely suggesting here that 
the five theories alone do not help us while bracketing the more intractable question of how best to explain how 
judges behave.  
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larger model of judicial motivation and behavior is beyond my aims here. My goal rather is 
solely to show that national security cases are not sharply different from other lines of public law 
jurisprudence.  
Consider first the absence of ex ante injunctive relief in national security case law, 
identified in Part I.B. Ex ante prevention of potentially unconstitutional government action, 
especially involving coercion, is almost always the exception in other areas of public law. 
Doctrinal barriers from abstention rules to “political question” constraints to standing doctrine 
generally push judicial intervention away from the front-end of government action. Plaintiffs 
cannot seek preemptive relief against anticipated government coercion without evidence that 
they specifically will be targeted.142 In one area of police-citizenry contact frequently litigated in 
the Supreme Court—automotive stops—the Justices have stayed on the margins. “Officer safety” 
is the dominant concern of Fourth Amendment cases concerning the rules for encounters 
between police and drivers.143 Even at the apogee of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence, the “more immediate interest” that the Court recognized, documented, and 
protected was the protection of police against “unnecessary risk.”144 In its recent narrowing of 
the scope of permissible car searches incident to arrest, the Court still followed officer safety as 
its lodestar.145 Current regulation of the use of police deadly force is also weak and ex post.146 
The regulatory vacuum at the sharp edge of national security policy, in other words, is not 
distinct from the situation in analogous areas of social control. Rather, the national security case 
law is close to the norm rather than exceptional.   
Second, the absence of individual release via habeas corpus in national security cases is 
in line with trends in relief when habeas is used as a post-conviction remedy under 28 U.S.C § 
2254. In the national security context, even named habeas petitions in landmark cases win 
minimal individualized relief and do not secure release. For the habeas petitioner, victory on 
procedural grounds instead generally leads to more process, more delay, and thus more 
detention. Winning in the Supreme Court, for example, meant Hamdan risked at worst indefinite 
detention and at best protracted delay until the reconstitution of new military tribunals. Hamdi 
and the Rasul petitioners also won Pyrrhic remands and the prospect of extended future 
litigation. Like petitioners under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking reconsideration of a 
feeble agency rule, detainees often found that success had the practical result of deferring a 
                                                 
142 City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 471 US 95 (1983); Laird v Tatum, 408 US 1 (1972); cf United States v Richardson, 
418 US 166 (1974). 
143 See, for example, Thornton v United States, 541 US 615, 621 (2004). Even this Term’s narrowing of auto stop 
search authority was careful to endorse officer safety as a trumping concern. Arizona v Gant, 129 S Ct 1710, 1716 
(2009).  
144 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 23 (1968). Chief Justice Warren included a detailed footnote documenting the risk to 
officers in police stops. Id at 24 n 21.  
145 See Arizona v Gant, 129 S Ct 1710, 1716 (2009). 
146 See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 453, 466–478 
(2004) (describing absence of criminal or civil remedies against officers or institutional for police use of excessive 
force). 
28 
 
desired goal.147 Although Rasul, Hamdi, and Boumediene did lead to releases, these followed 
indirectly from changes in policy and not directly from compliance with specific judgments. 
Detainees acquitted in new military commission proceedings also do not thereby gain freedom. 
To the contrary, in July 2009 the general counsel of the Department of Defense emphasized that 
the Government reserved the right to continue to hold terrorism-related detainees after an 
acquittal under a claim of wartime detention authority.148  
The situation is strikingly similar to quotidian federal habeas review of state court 
criminal convictions. Federal postconviction review of state criminal judgments today yields 
vanishingly small returns. A 2007 study found that of 2,384 noncapital habeas cases sampled, 
only eight resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one was reversed on appeal.149 One account of 
the 2007 study concluded that “as a means of correcting or deterring routine case-specific 
constitutional errors, habeas is completely ineffective.”150 The parallel remedial lacuna in two 
very different contests does not necessarily prove that the underlying frequency of meritorious 
claims is similar in the two areas. Such a claim would be hard to sustain not least because the 
notion of a “meritorious” claim is endogenous to evolving procedural standards under the 
different sections of the federal habeas statute implicated by collateral review and executive 
detention cases.151 Rather, the parallel shows simply that federal courts are equally unwilling or 
unable in two disparate applications of habeas to indulge in the individualized remedy of release.    
Third, the difficulty of recovering money damages under Iqbal and its ilk is familiar from 
Bivens and constitutional tort jurisprudence more generally.152 Reformers have long advocated a 
                                                 
147 For the asymmetry in the administrative law context, see Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, Retaking 
Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 159–61 (Oxford, 
2008). 
148 See Spencer Ackerman, Obama Military Commissions Vision Takes Shape, Wash Indep (July 7, 2009), online at 
http://washingtonindependent.com/49966/obama-military-commissions-vision-takes-shape (visited Feb 17, 2010). 
See also Testimony of Jeh Johnson, General Counsel, Department of Defense to United States Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, July 28, 2009, online at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4002&wit_id=8157 
(visited Feb 17, 2010). 
149 Nancy J. King et al, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of 
Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 52, 58, 116 
(2007), online at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf (visited Feb 17, 2010). Success rates are 
slightly higher in state court habeas actions. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 Va L Rev 1, 64–65 (2006). 
150 Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 NYU L Rev 791, 
793 (2009).  
151 See, for example, Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 623 (1993) (announcing “substantial and injurious effect” 
test for certain constitutional errors in habeas).  
152 More recent empirical research suggests that prospects for Bivens plaintiffs are more sanguine. One study 
sampled cases from five federal district courts. It suggested that Bivens litigants prevail in roughly the same 
proportion of cases (16%) as other civil rights claimants, without controlling for clearly frivolous cases that are 
dismissed sua sponte. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for 
the Individual Liability Model, 62 Stan L Rev -- (forthcoming 2010), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475356 (visited Feb 17, 2010). This is not inconsistent with the 
pattern of limited success observed in national security cases. Rather, the Supreme Court’s disapproving view of 
Bivens claims persists across both national security and non-national security cases. See, for example, Wilkie v 
Robbins, 127 S Ct 2588 (2007); Correctional Servs Corp v Malesko, 534 US 61 (2001).  
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transition from individual to government liability,153 even as others scholars evince skepticism 
about constitutional tort’s deterrence value.154 Iqbal adds little novel to the familiar moves in 
constitutional tort law. Rather, Iqbal merely replays the Court’s longstanding efforts to find some 
equilibrium between compensatory and expressive aims on the one hand, and the mitigation of 
disfavored deterrence effects on the other.155 But the Court is not trading off between these two 
goals in any coherent way. The Court in Iqbal demoted tort’s compensatory function. In another 
case the same Term, a unanimous Court marginalized constitutional tort’s expressive function.156  
The net result is entrenchment of a regime of de minimis liability with no correlative expansion 
of the expressive or norm-clarification function. This regime is stable only because an elusive 
residual possibility of remediation suffices to deflate interest-group mobilization for 
congressional modifications.157 Outright judicial repudiation of constitutional tort—so far a 
move the Court has not intimated—would probably be needed now to reset policy in any 
meaningful way.158  
Further, it is not clear that the magnitude of deterrence effects from government tort 
liability would differ between the national security context and the larger public law context, and 
in which direction any variance from the mean would be.159 The scale of any overdeterrence 
from damages awards (under Bivens but also under 42 USC §1983) is not known. In part this is 
because the government often (but not always) provides defendants in individual liability suits 
with representation and pays settlements or judgments.160 It is also not clear whether the risk of 
                                                 
153 Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Courts, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 
1980 Sup Ct Rev 281, 307–10, 345–51 (making deterrence argument and commending entity liability). See also 
Larry Kramer & Alan O. Styles, Municipal Liability under §1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1988 Sup Ct 
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154 See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 
U Chi L Rev 345, 370–71 (2000). But see David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights 
and Restricting Remedies, 2005 U Ill L Rev 1119, 1125 (2005) (arguing that damages do deter).  
155 Compensation awards depend on a finding of liability, and hence have an asymmetrical deterrence effect on 
officials, who are focused to internalize the cost of mistakes even though they do not internalize the full benefit of 
their actions.  
156 See Pearson v Callahan, 129 S Ct 808 (2009) (rejecting the rule of Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194 (2001), that 
courts adjudicating qualified immunity defenses must ascertain whether a constitutional rule was violated before 
determining whether it was clearly established at the time of the alleged tort). Pearson saps the justification of 
qualified immunity as a means of reducing the transaction cost of innovation in constitutional norms. John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L J 87, 92 (1999).  
157 See Cornelia T L Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability 
under Bivens, 88 Geo L J 65, 68 (1999) (observing status quote in mid-1990s legislative efforts). In any case, it is 
hardly clear how the diffuse class of possible constitutional tort plaintiffs could overcome evident transaction costs 
to collective actions to seek legislated change. 
158 Cf Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum L 
Rev 689, 693 (2003).  
159 Daryl Levinson has questioned both deterrence effects and deterrence-based rationales. See Levinson, 67 U Chi L 
Rev at 370–71 (cited in note 154). 
160 See 28 CFR § 50.15(a), (b) (indemnification regulations for Department of Justice employees); see Pillard, 88 
Geo L J at 77, n 54 (cited in note 157) (listing indemnification regulations for other agencies and departments). 
Pillard suggests that generally “indemnification is a virtual certainty.” Id at 76–77.  
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overdeterrence is greater or less in national security cases. It may be less because “[f]ear compels 
people”—including government officials—“to devote resources to solving a problem that for a 
dispassionate and uninvolved person may be interesting but not compelling.”161 Alternatively, 
the prospect of compensation for errors may ease conscientious officials’ discomfort, making 
more stringent exigent responses less costly and hence more frequent. Absent empirical evidence 
about the motivations of government officials, it is impossible to know whether or how 
deterrence operates differently in national security and in general constitutional tort law. 
Functionally as well as doctrinally, it is therefore hard to segregate national security from the 
larger domain of public law when it comes to damages.    
 The final trend that demands explanation is the surprising incidence of de facto 
“structural” injunctions in national security law. Here again, there is a correlation with trends in 
public law. Federal courts have grappled now for decades with allegations of pervasive 
constitutional violations within “large-scale organizations, particularly government bureaucracies 
[that] define to a substantial degree our social existence.”162 In these contexts, just as in national 
security, there is a persistent “large gap between executive discretion and judicial capacities.”163 
Individual remediation, from the judiciary’s perspective, is a suboptimal strategy because it has 
little dampening effect on the rate of future violations. The close link between right and remedy 
typifying private-law adjudication breaks down in complex environments, precipitating judicial 
experiments with broader, process-based remedies.164 In a range of areas of social policy, from 
prisons to policing and from psychiatric institutions to education, courts instead select 
interventions that ramify beyond an individual case “to unsettle and open up public institutions 
that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from the 
normal processes of political accountability.”165 Although structural injunctions common in the 
1960s and 1970s are no longer frequent, similar remedial forms obtain today. These do not 
always take the form sensu stricto of structural injunctions celebrated by previous generations of 
legal scholars, but they are nonetheless orders that “see[k] to effectuate the reorganization of a 
social institution.”166 In a recent survey of de facto structural public law remedies, numerous 
judicial actions were identified in several areas of public policy that tended to “disentrench or 
unsettle a public institution when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum standards of adequate 
performance and, second, it is substantially immune from conventional political mechanisms of 
correction.”167   
Interventions with structural consequences in the post-9/11 national security detention 
domain are analogous to public law remedies. General public law remediation of defective 
                                                 
161 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 63 (cited in note 8). 
162 Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo L J 1355, 1386 (1991).  
163 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 893 (2007); id at 890–93 (cataloging 
reasons why judicial oversight may fall short, even if not “a total failure”).  
164 Sturm, 79 Geo L J at 1377, 1388 (cited in note 162) (listing distinctive features of public law remedies).  
165 Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv 
L Rev 1015, 1020 (2004).  
166 Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 7 (Indiana 1978). 
167 Sabel & Simon, 117 Harv L Rev at 1062 (cited in note 165). 
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institutions aims to include previously excluded voices, force systemic reform by imposing new 
standards of conduct drawn from other fields, and generate transparency mandates to “induc[e] 
the institution to reform itself.”168 Analogously, rulings adverse to the executive in national 
security detention have opened the policy-making field not only to the federal courts and 
Congress, but also to detainees via counsel. Against the executive’s urgings, the Court imposes 
exogenous standards derived from international humanitarian law “to define minimum 
performance.”169 Merely by allowing cases to move forward, the federal courts additionally force 
transparency via attorney access and the availability of discovery. Repeated resort to orders with 
structural repercussions in national security case law is thus of a piece with federal courts’ 
strategies in other areas of public law.   
One especially intriguing parallel turns on the federal courts’ use of the habeas remedy as 
part of a strategy of structural change in two quite distinct contexts. Federal court remediation of 
errors in state criminal adjudications is a relatively recent phenomenon.170 Only after the 1953 
judgment in Brown v Allen171 did habeas review of state criminal adjudication systems become a 
tool in the restructuring of state criminal justice processes. Habeas’s shift was not an isolated 
event. It occurred at a time that the Court was simultaneously “radically transform[ing] the role 
of federal constitutional law in state criminal cases.”172 Habeas was a means “to retry new cases 
applying the newly created rules,”173 one tool in the larger Due Process revolution that swept 
state criminal procedure during the Warren Court. Hence, whereas Hamdan, Hamdi, and 
Boumediene aim to bring military detention into procedural conformity with the Justices’ ideal of 
due process, the post-Brown incarnation of habeas (which did not endure long past the Warren 
Court) was a way of bring state criminal justice systems into conformity with another due 
process ideal. Far from being a tool of individual liberation one case at a time, perhaps the 
central purpose of twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century habeas has been justice at a 
systemic, aggregated level.174  
One way of explaining the Court’s willingness to grant sweeping structural remedies may 
be as a response to public and elite expectations of judges fostered by a heroic counter-
majoritarian narrative of the judicial role born in the second half of the twentieth century. On this 
account, Justices inherit and apply a heroic model of the federal courts exemplified best by 
                                                 
168 Id at 1056, 1062–73. 
169 Id at 1063. 
170 See Joseph L. Hoffman and William J. Stuntz, Habeas after the Revolution, 1993 Sup Ct Rev 65, 73–76.  
171 344 US 443 (1953) (holding that federal habeas courts were not precluded by state rulings on matters of 
constitutional right). Also significant was Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963), which limited for a time the effect of state 
court procedural defaults.  
172 Hoffman and Stuntz, 1993 Sup Ct Rev at 77 (cited in note 170). Even Gerald Rosenberg, who is otherwise 
skeptical of the efficacy of judicial action, attributes significance to decisions about the right to counsel. See Gerald 
D. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 330–31 (Chicago 1991). 
173 Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 424 (Harvard, 2000). Powe properly cautions that 
many new rights were not retroactively applied. Id at 425–29.  
174 I do not mean to suggest, however, any conclusion about how effective quasi-structural injunctive litigation has 
been. This seems to me that is a hard, and properly contested, question. 
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Brown v Board of Education.175 If Justices’ role-conception and sense of prestige entails a 
commitment to a heroic model, they may prefer to channel interventions into high-profile cases 
in which their stance will be observed and celebrated, further enhancing their prestige.176 
Individual remediation, notwithstanding periodic judicial verbiage about the value of individual 
rights,177 secures the courts little political or reputational capital. It is thus slighted. More 
cynically, this account might be supplemented by the suggestion that the Justices’ reputational 
motivations are constrained by the possibility, however remote, of the public backlash that would 
ensue if an individual who gains individual relief later goes on to participate in a terrorist 
conspiracy. Here, the Justices’ beliefs about the public reception of decisions play a large role. A 
less cynical account would posit that the Justices are allocating scarce judicial time and public 
support to maximize their constitutional goals. On this account, the emphasis on structural 
interventions is simply a way to secure maximal policy change with limited tools under 
conditions of constraining political opposition.   
 There is, in sum, a correlation between courts’ remedial strategies in national security law 
and in public law. Plausible accounts of the causal mechanisms behind this correlation can be 
imagined. Exploration of these causal accounts would demand further scrutiny beyond the scope 
of this paper. The important point here is that the similarity between national security cases and 
the general public law is a second source of evidence that the national security exceptionalism 
hypothesis is flawed.  
 
B. 
 
The mine run of public law cases is not the only body of jurisprudence against which 
judicial responses to national security emergencies might be compared. A second way of testing 
the exceptionalism thesis may be to look at judicial responses to crises that lack a national 
security dimension. By way of example, the financial crisis of 2008–09 precipitated numerous 
extraordinary legislative and executive initiatives designed to stave off an economic 
depression.178 Despite claims that government responses overstepped constitutional bounds,179 
judicial challenges to the diverse regulatory reactions to the financial sector’s failure180 have 
                                                 
175 347 US 483 (1954).  
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179 John Schwartz, Some Ask if Bailout Is Unconstitutional, NY Times (Jan 15, 2009) at A8 (describing some 
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been few and far between. The one exception to this pattern—the challenge to the bankruptcy 
sale of the auto-maker Chrysler’s assets from Indiana-based pension and retirement funds—does 
not support the proposition that federal courts behave differently in national security emergencies 
than in non-national security crises.  
 In April 2009, Chrysler filed a pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the 
Southern District of New York with the support and involvement of the federal government. The 
petition proposed the transfer of substantially all of Chrysler’s operating assets to a new entity to 
be part-owned by the Italian firm Fiat.181 Indiana pension and retirement funds attacked the sale 
as, among other things, a sub rosa reorganization.182 After the bankruptcy judge and the Second 
Circuit signed off on the proposed bidding procedures and sale, the Second Circuit nevertheless 
temporarily stayed the sale so as to allow Supreme Court review.183 Despite urgent pleas to 
enjoin the sale, and even though a sale would have been very hard subsequently to unwind, the 
Supreme Court declined to intervene via its emergency stay power.184  
Two aspects of this complex litigation are salient here. First, as in the national security 
context, the federal courts identified “consequential and vexed”185 constitutional issues in the 
asset sale but nonetheless declined an invitation to ex ante intervention. The Roberts Court 
resisted any temptation to follow the example of the Chase Court’s short-lived and ill-fated 
effort, one hundred and fifty years previously, to regulate the Lincoln Administration’s 
emergency resort to paper money in response to the fiscal crisis created by the Civil War.186 The 
absence of ex ante judicial regulation in this case echoes the pattern observed in public law more 
generally. Second, the mechanism of an asset sale used to reconstitute Chrysler in its “basic 
structure” is “increasingly … the norm.”187 That is, in its details as well as in the overall shape of 
judicial supervision, the federal courts’ response to this part of the financial crisis did not break 
new ground but mimicked a pattern emerging under non-emergent conditions.188 In sum, while 
this snapshot of judicial responses to the financial crisis is no doubt incomplete, it does provide 
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an additional datum in support of the thesis of commonality in judicial responses across policy 
areas.  
 
III. 
 
What is the significance of this continuity between remedial strategies in national security 
cases on the one hand and in public law generally on the other? If national security 
exceptionalism is either overstated or untenable, what follows for our accounts of judicial 
behavior in the national security domain? In the balance of this essay, I identify two possible 
lines of further exploration. One is analytic, the other normative.  
The first possible lesson is analytic: To understand judicial responses in the national 
security domain, it is necessary to look at interactions between that area and transubstantive 
bodies of rules concerning procedures and remedies. This interaction can have implications both 
for substantive bodies of law—e.g., the direction of national security law—and for 
transubstantive procedural and remedial rules. At the moment, however, interaction effects 
between substantive law and procedural rules are insufficiently studied.  
Iqbal furnishes an example of this interaction. Consider the result in Iqbal from two 
different points of view: the decision’s effect on national security law and its impact on general 
civil litigation. As national security litigation goes, Iqbal was a damp squib. It will not have a 
significant effect on damages litigation in the area because few cases prevail anyway.189 But, 
Iqbal works a sea change in the general federal civil litigation landscape.190 Iqbal “has 
exponentially expanded the reach of fact pleading” and repudiated the notice pleading rule 
applied for more than fifty years.191 In even the first two months after it was handed down, Iqbal 
was cited in 603 district court and court of appeals decisions192; it also triggered a movement for 
legislative reform.193 Anecdotal data suggest that the elevated citation rate reflects new decision 
costs that flow from heightened uncertainty about an elemental pleading rule.194  
The odd combination of local inconsequentiality and global significance is the result of 
an interaction between a substantive field of law and transubstantive rules. The opinion manages 
this feat because the Court’s opinion muddies the distinction between national security concerns 
and transubstantive procedural questions. Justice Kennedy warned of the “heavy costs” exacted 
when government officials are sued, costs present whenever the government is restrained195 but 
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35 
 
“magnified” in the national security context.196 Justice Kennedy then implicitly reasoned from 
this local diagnosis to a transubstantive result.   
Iqbal is not unique in this regard.  In 1949, Judge Learned Hand wrote a path-marking 
opinion on official immunity in Gregoire v Biddle, which concerned the arrest and prolonged 
detention of a French national erroneously believed to be an enemy alien during the Cold War.197 
Gregoire provided the basis for the Supreme Court’s twentieth-century resurrection of immunity 
doctrines based on concern about the possible chilling of official action in all areas, not just 
national security.198 As in Iqbal, analysis of an issue apparently local to the national security 
context motivated a larger transubstantive change. Both Gregoire and Iqbal illustrate a 
mechanism beneath the oft-overlooked truism that “each dispute … affects others and reshapes 
the political landscape, inhibiting some behaviors and enabling others.”199 While some 
consequences of the efflorescence of a federal common law of official immunity are reasonably 
clear, it remains to be seen how Iqbal’s change in pleading rules will alter the pool of civil cases 
filed, especially in the national security domain, and how this change will in turn stimulate 
further shifts in the federal civil pleading regime or other transubstantive rules.  
This kind of interaction may be frequent, even if not pervasive, in legal doctrine. 
Consider the interaction between the Court’s changing attitude to the death penalty on the one 
hand and its adjustment of habeas rules, or the interaction of standing doctrine with 
environmental law.200 There is no reason national security law would be free of it. This dynamic 
also raises important institutional design questions. Consider, for example, the optimal approach 
to changing transubstantive procedural rules. On one account, Iqbal achieved this with low 
decision costs: Reliance on national security-specific reasons eased the adoption of the new 
transubstantive rule. From a wider perspective though, the wisdom of changing transubstantive 
rules through reasoning rooted in one substantive area of law may be doubted. Even if a more 
robust pleading rule were needed—a matter about which I express no view here201—it is difficult 
to defend the manner in which the Iqbal Court chose to rewrite that rule. There is a statutorily 
designated avenue for reconsideration of procedural rules: a multi-stage rule-making procedure 
set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. Rule-making under the Act likely would have generated 
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36 
 
information and clarity,202 but it was not used. As a result, the scope of Iqbal is unclear.203 
Moreover, the resulting rule is costly to apply. For fifty years, Rule 8 had been applied in a clear, 
if arguably generous,204 manner. Displacing a well-known and fully explored rule, Iqbal 
propounds a vague, open-textured, and subjective standard. The stability benefits of fifty years’ 
precedent were, at a stroke, eviscerated.205 Justice Kennedy’s opinion leaves tantalizing clues as 
to how it should be applied without attaining precision or clarity. The Court’s emphasis on 
“context,” for example, hints that the Justices have in mind some taxonomy of issue-specific 
pleading rules.206 But Iqbal gives no guidance as to how to classify and organize complaints by 
“context.”207 Instead, the decision invites 680-plus district judges to conjure rules on the fly by 
applying 680-plus distinct bodies of “judicial experience and common sense” to assess 
“plausibility.”    
To summarize, interactions between substantive bodies of law and transubstantive rules 
change the way that judicial decision rules are adopted and amended. They are thus important 
independent objects of study. Future longitudinal studies of the development of national security 
programs via interactions between courts, legislative institutions, public opinion, and the 
executive may reveal other causal mechanisms, such as feedback loops,208 and variables with 
predictive value that until now have been overlooked. 
Rejection of the descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism has a second 
consequence, one related to normative theorizing about the judicial role in emergencies. 
Specifically, the rejection of national security exceptionalism may be welcomed or condemned 
depending on its net effects, which have until now not been carefully considered. Begin with the 
implications of my argument for a civil libertarian who views the federal courts as a bulwark for 
individual rights. On the one hand, a finding of invariance between judicial responses to national 
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security and larger dynamics in public law may be troubling. Spillover effects that result from 
the convergence of national security with general public law, such as in Iqbal, may create an 
incrementalist avenue to across-the-board abrogation of the federal courts’ liberty-protecting 
function.209 Routinized emergencies, or even a persistent flow of cases arising from one 
emergency, may therefore have broadly corrosive effects. On the other hand, continuity between 
national security law and other domains may strengthen the prophylactic effect of the federal 
judiciary’s presence. The belief that judges have a stable disposition or follow constant rules may 
induce beliefs on the part of other governmental actors that minimize rights violation.210 The net 
effect of the analysis, in short, is uncertain from a civil libertarian perspective.  
Another normative consequence of the rejection of national security exceptionalism for 
civil libertarians may be the need to rethink the role of democratic politics in setting emergency 
responses. The trajectory of national security programs is thought to be wholly fixed in the “red 
hot” furnace of emergency.211 This emphasis on emergency can be generalized into a model of 
sovereignty as “unitary and decisive, committed to its own invulnerability” and insulated from 
democratically determined legal rules.212 But, the rejection of national security exceptionalism 
turns attention away from a narrow focus upon how best to respond to specific emergencies, and 
toward the matter of how a democracy “surviv[es] the emergency situation with integrity as a 
democracy.”213 That is, how should doctrinal and judicial incentives be structured to ensure the 
continuity of rules, procedures, and remedies across emergencies and other times? If this kind of 
integrity is valued—and, of course, many reject its significance—courts might be institutional 
mechanisms for the preservation of a larger public “culture of civil liberties.”214 Alternatively, it 
may be that emergencies are moments at which such a culture is abandoned or incrementally 
sapped. From an alternative normative perspective more concerned with security, similar 
questions arise about the judicial role in national security and its effect on the broader operation 
of the federal judiciary.   
One final consequence is worth noting. “National security law” is fast becoming a sub-
discipline within the legal academy with a paraphernalia of case books, specialists, central 
questions, and well-defined camps. In the early stages of this development, there may be an 
understandable tendency to make claims on behalf of the sub-discipline’s insulation from other 
legal debates. My analysis of national security exceptionalism suggests this would be an error. 
                                                 
209 See Jervis, at 287 (cited in note 199) (“Understanding feedbacks … may allow actors to follow indirect routes to 
their goals, especially when information and beliefs are not fully shared.”). Iqbal, by making civil suits more 
difficult to file, is a significant step on such a road.  
210 Id at 23. For a related argument urging courts to look to administrative law rules as constraints on national 
security actions, see Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye? Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 
Hastings L J 441, 501–19 (2005) (examining and rejecting arguments for a distinction between the two fields of 
law). 
211 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 44 (cited in note 8). 
212 Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy 2 (Princeton, 2009). This model has been 
extended from the emergency context to general administrative law in Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian 
Administrative Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1095, 1103–04 (2009). 
213 Honig at 9 (cited at note 212).  
214 Stone, Perilous Times at 537 (cited in note 7) (emphasis in original). 
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Scholars of national security law will learn more by comparative glances across disciplinary 
lines than by the construction of distinguishing walls or isolating moats.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
National security exceptionalism does not find substantial support in the behavior of 
courts in post-9/11 non-criminal detention cases. The remedies that courts provide in these cases 
are surprisingly consistent, however, with the approach taken in other domains of public law. 
Taken together, these results provide some reason to view judicial responses to exigent national 
security policies not as exceptional but as thoroughly imbricated in the larger texture of 
American public law.  
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